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There should be a law which states that every scientist intending to carry out an environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) must first be presented with a statue of a dog.  Not just any animal, of course;  the 
statue, or more properly a memorial, would be of a dog which once belonged to the daughter of Leonard 
Coatsworth from Washington State, in the USA.  The dog's name was Tubby and, alas, poor Tubby was 
killed by Galloping Gertie on a November morning in 1940.  The death of Tubby, and indeed that of 
Galloping Gertie, who died at the same time, was a direct result of something which has always been a 
feature of scientific investigation, but whose effects are now increasingly becoming the focus of many 
environmental issues.  The problem can be summed up thus: 
 
 Q.: What's the difference between a correct and an incorrect theory? 
 A.: About ten years. 
 
This dictum, for which I am indebted to Dr Hans Joosten of Utrecht, neatly expresses the fact that any 
existing scientific model is almost certain to be modified or even completely overturned by subsequent 
discoveries.  Predictions for much more than 10-20 years hence, based on present-day models, have a 
significant probability of ultimately proving to be, if not wrong, then at least not quite right.  The greater 
the complexity of the system being modelled, the greater the probability that this will prove to be so.  It is 
a fact which environmental consultants would do well to consider before making unduly optimistic 




Bridge building, oscillations and vortices 
The Tacoma Narrows Bridge was designed by one of the leading bridge designers of his day, Leon 
Moitseief.  At the time, it was considered to be a daring, innovative example of engineering, but 
ultimately its intended purpose was simply to bridge the Narrows.  It was expected to do this within the 
limitations of known engineering safety tolerances because no-one was going to pay for a bridge which 
was unsafe to use;  but that was exactly what Moitseief eventually provided for the people of Washington 
State. 
 
Within weeks of opening, it was observed that, in any sort of wind, the bridge would oscillate up and 
down, very slowly.  The Tacoma Narrows Bridge, rapidly renamed 'Galloping Gertie', was proving to 
possess aeroelastic properties which had never before been encountered or even dreamed of within 
bridge-building circles.  While sightseers came simply to gaze in amazement, engineers came to measure 
the process.  They considered the various stresses on the fabric of the bridge, and declared that, although 
the motion was undoubtedly unusual, the bridge was nevertheless quite safe and could remain open even 
when 'galloping'. 
This view prevailed until one November morning in 1940.  On that day, a 40 mile/hr wind blew steadily 
down the Narrows and people began observing a new phenomenon.  Whereas, on all previous occasions, 
Gertie had simply oscillated up and down, now she was going up and down and beginning to twist from 
side to side.  By the time Leonard Coatsworth and Tubby reached the bridge in Leonard's car, the 
combined oscillations were just getting into their stride.  Once on the bridge, further progress was clearly 
impossible.  Mr Coatsworth, Tubby and several other motorists found themselves stranded on a bucking 
leviathan.  Police closed the bridge and managed to persuade all of the occupants in stranded vehicles to 
run to safety - all, that is, except Tubby, who absolutely refused to leave the vehicle.  Newsreels of the 
time show Mr Coatsworth, minus Tubby, staggering from the bridge like a drunken man as steel and 
concrete heave and roll around him in the manner of a confused sea.  A short while later the newsreels 
also show the entire structure finally tearing apart and collapsing into the Narrows, carrying poor Tubby 
and Gertie to a watery grave.  [see video:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XggxeuFDaDU].  When 
asked later about the cause of the phenomenon, Moitseief simply said 'I have no idea.'  He died not long 
after the disaster, a mystified and broken man. 
With the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, Moitseief had employed engineering techniques which were well 
tested and thoroughly researched.  He had taken the design just a little way into new territory by making 
the ratio of width to length slightly greater than had been attempted before, but, because there was no 
existing evidence to suggest otherwise, no problems were anticipated with this.  It was only 52 years later, 
in 1992, that science finally caught up with Nature and was able to show that Gertie's self-destructive 
change from vertical to lateral oscillations was a result of von Karmen vortices.  The effect of such 
vortices on a structure such as Gertie were an entirely unknown phenomenon in the 1930s. 
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The Ferrybridge Disaster 
Despite the name, Ferrybridge is not another bridge disaster, nor was it a project intended to push back 
the frontiers of engineering.  The construction of cooling towers for power stations was, by the early 
1960s, a well-established and somewhat prosaic engineering process.  The several towers of the 
Ferrybridge Power Station in Yorkshire were all constructed using standard techniques.  Nothing novel 
here. 
Except that, on the afternoon of a windy November day in the early 1960s (perhaps the patron saint of 
engineers takes a break every November), one of the concrete and steel towers in the complex began to 
behave in a distinctly novel way.  It started to oscillate, wobbling like a badly made pot on a potter's 
wheel.  The wobbles became increasingly violent until, as anyone who has attempted pottery will 
recognise, the instability moved rapidly and inexorably towards an unavoidable and catastrophic climax.  
Millions of fascinated TV viewers watched the evening news to see the violent wobbles cause the flailing 
upper parts of the tower finally to shear off.  The whole 375-foot construction then collapsed in a heap of 
rubble and twisted steel. 
What happened next was almost as incredible.  Even before the dust had settled on the TV screens, an 
expert was wheeled on explain how the disaster had happened.  With the day's gale gusting at up to 
85 mile/hr, huge vortices caused by adjoining cooling towers had created such powerful forces of suction 
that the fabric of one particular tower had been quite unable to cope with the resultant stresses and had 
simply disintegrated.  I well remember the sense of wonder which this revelation provoked.  'Good 
Heavens!', we exclaimed as we listened to this expert, 'then why were the towers not designed either to 
avoid, or to cope with, such vortices?  After all, gales of 85 m.p.h. are not so unusual in Britain.'  The 
answer, of course, lay in the undisclosed fact that the possible development of these vortices, and their 
subsequent impact, had been unsuspected by engineers until they were observed to occur in the real 
world, at Ferrybridge. 
 
Engineering and the real world 
In effect, to carry out an experiment and then develop a model which can provide useful predictions, a 
scientist will try as far as possible to provide an environment which is entirely controlled or measured.  
Even bridge builders, however, in their relatively rigidly-defined world of concrete and steel, recognise 
the limitations of their craft when faced with the unpredictable real world.  Rod Rhys Jones, an 
engineering consultant, observes: 
 
 How much can engineers possibly know about the future?  Bridges are there a long time.  
Engineers have to know the unknowable, predict the unpredictable.  They have to be able to 
account for Acts of God.1 
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Bridges are certainly there a long time, some even pre-date the origins of some valued wildlife habitats, 
but although the common objective of both bridge-building and conservation is to maintain the working 
fabric of a bridge or habitat as far into the foreseeable future as possible, the bridge-builder always knows 
that, should the need arise, another bridge can be built to replace the existing structure.  For the majority 
of valued wildlife habitats, such artificial reconstruction is simply not possible - existing attempts at 
habitat recreation or regeneration have yet to show any significant level of success.  They currently 
represent no more than the first stumbling steps of ecological engineers into a vast and largely uncharted 
territory.  Over-confidence at such an early stage in the exploration of this relatively new field could all 
too easily lead entire species groups into blind alleys from which there is no return - unlike bridge design, 
the luxury of two bites at the cherry is not one of the characteristic features of extinction. 
 
Klaus Ostenfield, Bridge Director of COWI Consultants, recognises that, in relation to projects where the 
bridge builder is also going into uncharted territory: 
 
 [The designer] runs the risk of having overseen something, so every time you make a long 
extrapolation in technology, you have to watch out and be very careful in order to make sure you 
see what you cannot see.1  
Such cautionary thoughts come from engineers who deal for the most part quite literally in concrete facts.  
The majority of bridge design is utterly predictable.  The designer's biggest worry is that the real world 
will intrude on this ordered, measured and precisely defined exercise with some previously unrecognised 
mischief.  For a bridge-designer the majority of facts are solid, and only a few elements of un-
predictability are expected to seep into the final process. 
The one major change in circumstances, when the engineer finally takes a design or a model from the 
laboratory out into the real world and begins construction, is that the design is then subject to the much 
more complex environment of the real world, and this may throw up a few surprises.  Indeed, the 
common causative factor in the collapse of both Galloping Gertie and Ferrybridge was nothing to do with 
engineering per se.  Both resulted from a series of atmospheric tricks which were, until that point, 
completely unknown to the engineer, and which only became apparent when the design was subjected to 
the the unpredictability of the real world. 
It is important to understand that 'unpredictability' doesn't mean some Luddite view of a world which is 
hopelessly chaotic (though we will come back to that word), a world beyond any possibility of 
measurement and thus whose future behaviour is subject only to, in footballer Diego Maradonna's famous 
phrase, 'the Hand of God.'  The word is used here very deliberately to contrast conditions in the outside 
world with the 'controlled conditions' of a laboratory environment.  The very idea of experiments carried 
out in 'controlled conditions' logically indicates that everything outside these conditions must be 
'uncontrolled' - i.e. unpredictable, or at least not measured. 
The furore over 'cold fusion' centres, in part, over accusations that physicists Pons and Fleischmann failed 
to control their experimental conditions sufficiently closely, and that perhaps some of the products they 
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observed were therefore derived from entirely unrelated and unrecorded external processes.  This 
accusation may or may not be true, but it does illustrate the very rigorous application by the general 
scientific community of the concept of 'controlled conditions'.  It also highlights the common problem 
which faces scientists when carrying out any experiment - namely the ease with which unpredictable 
factors can slip into what is a supposedly controlled environment.  One of the biggest problems in 
maintaining this set of conditions is ensuring that the real world is not inadvertently allowed to intrude on 
the experiment.  All scientists know the problem, even within the closed world of the laboratory - low 
readings from a dirty electrode, a fault in the deionised water supply, stray Penicillium mold on an agar 
plate... 
In an engineering project, the actual process of design and construction rests largely on the use of 
materials and techniques which have already undergone exhaustive tests and trials under laboratory 
conditions.  Othmar H. Ammann, chief designer of the Brooklyn Bridge, produced 'a design so precise 
that engineers considered the job half-finished when workmen appeared on the site, in 1959'.  He knew 
that the 693 ft twin towers would need to support 150,000 tons of roadway and cable, and that the towers 
themselves would weigh 48,000 tons.  He calculated, and was subsequently proved right, that the weight 
of the completed road deck would cause the suspension cables to sag by exactly 28 feet below their un-
laden arc.  He was able, because of laboratory tests which showed the behaviour of metals under differing 
conditions, to allow for summer expansions and winter contractions which would alter the height of the 
span by as much as 6 ft, and when the wind blew, enable the whole span to distort up to 14 ft sideways.  
Ammann was able to do this because the vast majority of steps in the design process were already 
robustly proven techniques, some of which went back to Roman times or even earlier.  The construction 
process was almost entirely calculable, predictable and, in effect, simply represented a scaled-up version 
of controlled laboratory conditions. 
Compared with this relative bedrock of certainty and arsenal of precisely defined measurements, the 
environmental consultant embarks on an EIA (while clutching a little statue of Tubby) to be confronted 
with a maelstrom of uncertainty, in which the majority of elements are uncertain or unknown and are 
anyway constantly fluctuating.  Often, the only concrete facts are those which relate to the actual fabric of 
the proposal - the engineering details of the dam, factory, barrage, wind turbine, road, quarry or whatever.  
Virtually every other factor which must be measured or modelled is instead something which lies outside 
the predictable world of the controlled environment.  Few elements of the environment have given up 
their secrets to definitive laboratory analysis.  Yet the job of the consultant is not merely to understand 
how the ecosystem works initially, but then to determine the impact of a potentially profound change on 
this real and 'unpredictable' environment.  The EIA consultant, in other words, is very much at the 
opposite end of the certainty-spectrum from the bridge-designer. 
 
The unregulated environment 
Another important difference between the bridge-designer and the EIA consultant is that bridge-design is 
heavily regulated.  A whole range of safety codes must be followed, otherwise the designer faces 
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prosecution, particularly if disaster strikes.  The world of EIA is, in contrast, regulated in only the most 
general way.  For example, under the Commission for the European Communities (CEC) Directive 
85/337/EEC, member states of the European Union are required to ensure that EIAs are carried out under 
particular circumstances, but the regulations provide little in the way of practical guidelines relating to 
either content or quality.  Within the UK, relevant regulations were generally enacted in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s – e.g. The Environmental Assessment (Scotland) Regulations 1988 – and the official 
country conservation agencies have together arranged for the production of joint guidance relating to their 
functions within the EIA process, this guidance being in the form of the Environmental Assessment 
Handbook.  Then again, though providing a usefully detailed analysis of the steps required to carrying out 
and evaluate an EIA, the Handbook is not part of the legislation, and is thus not legally-binding. 
As far as the regulations themselves go, in the UK at least, the greater bulk of the legislation is concerned 
with determining whether an environmental assessment is required in the first place.  In describing the 
practical (as opposed to the broad) nature of any Environmental Assessment (EA) and the Environmental 
Statement (ES) which emerges from that, the legislation is remarkably coy. 
The intention of the CEC Directive is that developers should have considered the possible impacts of any 
proposed development at the earliest possible stage in their plans.  Encouraging the developer to carry out 
the EA studies is thought to be one means by which a direct interest in environmental issues can be 
engendered more widely.  Unfortunately, the translation of this philosophy into UK legislation embraces 
the concept to a greater degree than is perhaps helpful. 
A developer is required to provide to the planning authority a statement which includes (1) a description 
of the physical nature of the development, (2) data with which to assess the main environmental effects, 
(3) an analysis of likely significant effects (both direct and indirect) on:  humans, flora, fauna, soil, water, 
air, climate, the landscape, any interactions of the foregoing, material assets, the cultural heritage, (4) 
measures envisaged for avoiding, reducing or remedying effects and (5) a non-technical summary. 
 
An ES may, but is not legally obliged to, include amplification and explanation about: (1) land-use 
requirements during construction & operation, (2) the main environmental characteristics of the 
production process, (3) the expected type and quantity of residues, (4) alternative approaches examined, 
(5) direct & indirect effects of using natural resources and of the creation of wastes, (6) the forecasting 
methods used for (5), and (7) difficulties caused by technical deficiencies and information gaps.  It is 
recognised that the concept of 'effect' can include those of a secondary, cumulative, short/long term, 
permanent/temporary, or positive/negative nature. 
This list of items for investigation is undoubtedly comprehensive, but it's rather like saying to a randomly 
picked person, a dog-owner, perhaps, 'Here's some fish-plates, girders and tarmac - now build me a 
bridge'.  No statutory guidance is given as to the form which an ES must take;  how the developer goes 
about answering these questions is left entirely open.  The developer is simply told to provide sufficient 
information on all the listed issues for the planning authority to be able to make a judgement.  If the 
information is not considered adequate by the planning authority the developer can be requested to 
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provide more data until the authority is satisfied.  In the absence of a set framework by which an authority 
can be expected to judge an EA, this represents something of an open-ended commitment on the part of 
the developer because planning, scheduling and budgeting is very difficult for something which may, 
ultimately, and at the authority's request, turn into a major ecosystem analysis.  Even the consistently 
informative EA Handbook is sketchy in its treatment of the subject, stating blandly that no standard 
methods can usefully be provided. 
This lack of formal provision to ensure that common methods are used between different EAs also means 
that planning authorities, faced with two successive applications which are concerned with largely similar 
proposals, may not be able to transfer the knowledge and experience gained from one study over into the 
process of judging the second proposal.  Methods adopted in the two EAs may be so different that 
comparison of the results between the two may not be valid.  Nor will the planning authorities be able to 
benefit from what should be an accumulating knowledge pool as more EAs are carried out.  Similarly, 
developers are not easily able to draw on the experience and results of previous studies when carrying out 
their own investigations. 
The other major, and possibly more important, problem with the EA philosophy, as practiced, is that the 
entire process is concerned only with the stages prior to the granting of planning consent.  This arises 
from the laudable desire to ensure that environmental considerations are included at the earliest planning 
stages of a proposed development.  This is translated into UK legislation in the form of, as we have seen, 
a potentially exhaustive review of likely effects prior to a development being given approval, but nothing 
in the legislation provides for post-hoc monitoring and alterations.  The Handbook notes that monitoring 
after planning consent has been granted is possible through the provisions of planning conditions under, 
for example in England & Wales, Section 106 of the Town & Country Planning Act (1990).  However, 
the Handbook also observes that such actions are 'seldom undertaken in the British context', nor indeed is 
it common practice elsewhere in the world. 
The present system therefore has three crucial shortcomings: 
 
 1. the system fails to encourage any consistency of approach between developers and is thus 
a recipe for anarchy; 
 
 2. consequently neither developer nor planning authority can easily draw on the results of 
previous studies, nor is there any provision for the collation of such accumulating 
knowledge - each EA is a study unto itself; 
 
 3. the system is entirely predictive, concerned only with possible events in the future and, in 
practice at least, fails to continue impact assessment into the future to note actual effects -  
not being responsible for the subsequent outcome, EA teams thus have no direct incentive 
to make accurate predictions. 
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These flaws in the EIA system itself are then compounded by another, more potentially serious problem, 
more serious in that, with a simple change in the legislation all three failings listed above can be 
overcome, whereas this additional complication arises from something more deeply ingrained.  It is an 
aspect of scientific culture which has given rise to many remarkable examples of scientific conduct in 
relation to EIA work and Public Inquiry advocacy in Britain.  At its very worst, it can be described as 
scientific hubris, an arrogant assertion that science has all the answers.  Its more normal expression is 
found either in the belief that, as Robert Earll of the Marine Conservation Society describes it, 'absence of 
evidence' is synonymous with 'evidence of absence', or as a scientific caution which demands that proof 
of harm be obtained before action be taken, whether or not that harm can be reversed. 
The list of superficial, slap-dash, negligent, and in some cases frankly laughable EIA studies or statements 
which arise from this dangerous cocktail is long and not very edifying.  Far too many EIA studies are in 
reality no more than a cosmetic treatment of the issue, merely providing an environmental gloss to a 
proposal, a smooth and politically soothing lustre whose foundation is more worthy of Helena Rubenstein 
or Yves Saint Laurent than of the Royal Society or the National Academy of Sciences. 
Such studies claim to be professionally executed scientific assessments of the proposed development, yet 
many would be viewed with horror by the engineering profession if applied to the relatively predictable 
construction of bridges.  Applying them instead to the much more complex problem of the environment 
requires both greater caution and broader vision - caution to avoid over-confidence and vision to see 
possible connections, the evidence for which may not, as yet, be available. 
Finally, EIA scientists must also be prepared to overcome a particular philosophy which now seems to 
dominate much of the scientific community, as a result of which too many are reluctant to admit 
knowledge-gaps in their data and uncertainties in their predictions.  Oddly enough, although portrayed in 
popular myth as an evil ogre plotting to push a scheme through by guile or subterfuge, the developer is 
often largely blameless for the poor quality of an inadequate EIA.  Nor does the problem necessarily lie 
with the planning authority or the Secretary of State, because many of these poorly-executed EIAs are 
subsequently rejected.  These particular problems arise instead as the result of a particular scientific 
culture which has been allowed to grow up and in some circumstances almost stifle the spirit of scientific 
enquiry.  This culture could be called 'The Fear of Ignorance' and is discussed in Tom Wakeford's 
chapter. 
 
EIA and Scientific Peer Pressure 
The normal pre-requisite for publication in a respected scientific journal is proof that an experiment has 
been carried out in such a way as to ensure that all possible variables have been accounted for.  Such an 
approach is designed for science carried out under laboratory conditions.  It is a philosophy unsuited to 
investigations, no matter how objectively rigorous, in an open 'uncontrolled' environment.  Once an 
experiment moves outside the laboratory environment it becomes impossible to control all variables.  
Rather than expending useless effort on trying to do so, it therefore becomes more important to identify 
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those elements which can be measured, and those elements which cannot.  In general, those which cannot 
be measured or controlled will outnumber those which can, given the time and cost constraints under 
which a developer is usually operating. 
Many of these unregulated and unmeasured factors may have only a minor impact on the results obtained;  
such is the assumption of many studies.  However, it is quite possible that hitherto unsuspected influences 
are also affecting the data obtained.  For example, it is only with the development of the 'groundwater 
mound theory' by Hugh Ingram of Dundee University that it is now possible to explain changes in the 
vegetation of a peat bog some considerable distance from an afforestation scheme on that same bog.  
These observed changes are now understood to occur as a result of alterations in the overall shape of the 
bog water-table caused by water removal beneath the trees.  Previously, such changes were attributed 
solely to the effects of grazing or lack of regular burning. 
It is impossible to measure every aspect within, and connection to, an ecosystem.  Papers which are 
concerned with environmental issues and which also aim to provide scientific illumination to a problem 
should in principle provide a list of all those factors which might possibly have a bearing on the results, 
but which were not investigated, together with an assessment of the possible implications of these 
omissions.  This represents a type of scientific writing which is very different in kind from those papers 
which describe the more traditional type of controlled condition experiment.  Such disarming honesty 
would make interesting reading and would probably provide a rich vein for further scientific discussion 
and research.  Unfortunately such documents are currently rare animals. 
The reason for this rarity is, at last in part, that scientists are reluctant to admit that they might have 
missed something, that their experimental method is not as comprehensive as they would like, or that cost 
and time constraints have simply rendered a proper analysis impossible.  Indeed the scientific community 
at large and funding bodies in particular, do not welcome such admissions of omission.  Papers have less 
chance of finding their way into print if they clearly state that certain aspects remain unstudied even 
though these may have a material bearing on the issue at hand, than those which simply do not 
acknowledge such gaps in the experimental method.  Even academic reviewers will often be unaware of 
the full suite of features and connections which might have a significant bearing on a particular study.  
Ironically, it appears that being 'economical with the truth' is a better strategy than 'the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth'.  The derision with which scientists treat their colleagues in the 'social 
sciences' seems to intensify with the passing years.  At least most social scientists admit who complex 
their subject matter is.  This may seem harsh, but look at a range of scientific papers which describe an 
investigation into the natural world and consider what other factors may also have contributed to the 
observed effects – it is by no means unusual to come up with several which are not mentioned by the 
authors.  Although not quite the level of scientific fraud described in Broad and Wade's classic book The 
Betrayers of the Truth, some papers come pretty close. 
The pressures facing environmental scientists over the issue of experimental uncertainty and 
incompleteness, especially when attempting to carry out scientific investigations which resolve real-life 
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dilemmas, can be judged from some of the recent and occasionally quite heated discussions which have 
surrounded the concept of the 'precautionary principle'. 
 
The precautionary principle 
The unpredictability of many natural phenomena, and the undoubtedly limited level of understanding 
which ecological science is able to apply to most natural systems, has increasingly obliged politicians and 
administrators to recognise that even the very best advice provided by the scientific community must be 
leavened with a significant degree of caution.  Such acceptance of uncertainty has increasingly become 
formalised through intergovernmental action.  In particular, according to the UK Biodiversity Action 
Plan, the principle of 'precaution' will now form one of the primary mechanisms by which the UK 
Government intends to meet its obligations under the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development Convention on Biological Diversity, signed in June 1992. 
Such international commitments explicitly recognise the need to apply precaution when coming to 
decisions which may affect the natural biodiversity of a region or influence the natural sustainability of an 
area.  The precautionary principle is described by the government thus:  'interactions [of natural systems] 
are complex [and] where there is a significant chance of damage to our diversity occurring, conservation 
measures are appropriate even in the absence of conclusive [my emphasis] scientific evidence that the 
damage will occur' (HMSO 1994). 
 
This concept has attracted a lively response from certain scientific quarters.  A particularly illuminating 
set of papers published between 1990 and 1992 in the Marine Pollution Bulletin explores the various 
implications of such an approach, while Alex Milne has launched a vigorous attack on the 'precautionary 
principle' in New Scientist (June 1993), in response to previous articles from Mary Midgely (August 
1992) and Bryan Wynne and Sue Mayer (June 1993). 
 
Milne argues that the burden of proof which the precautionary principle places on industry is not merely 
an excessively onerous obligation, but one with which it is impossible to comply.  He argues that the 
precautionary principle is unsound and unscientific because: 
 
 1. the definition, derived originally from a German concept, states that action should be 
taken even before the definitive scientific proof of causal links between emission and 
effect has been obtained; 
 
 2. the principle recommends that action be taken prior to complete determination of 
'harmful limits'; 
 
 3. that the proof of 'no-harm' is impossible to demonstrate; 
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The precautionary principle as moral philosophy 
Taking Milne's last point first, most conservationists and scientists would agree with this.  The 
precautionary principle is indeed a philosophical approach, but this is because mankind's relationship with 
the outside world is generally a 'subjective', moral issue, rather than something which can be defined by 
science.  Science, of course, has no value judgements, and therefore the concept of 'harm', and the desire 
to avoid such harm, can have no place in a world ordered strictly by scientific principles.  In Milne's 
world, scientists who have devoted their entire working lives to a single species ought not to regard the 
extinction of their chosen species with anything but cool, scientific detachment.  From an objectively 
scientific platform, extinction provides an opportunity to investigate the impact which the loss of this 
species would have on the surrounding ecosystem.  It also provides an empty niche for exploitation by 
other species or even for the evolution of new species and thus the scientist is provided with potentially as 
rich a vein of research as was provided by the now-extinct species.  Few scientists would, however, 
propose that a species be driven to the brink of extinction in order to study ecosystem interactions. 
 
The anthropocentric view of the environmental care states that we should maintain a stable set of 
conditions, minimizing such extinctions and marked perturbations, to ensure that we, and succeeding 
generations, can continue to survive and harvest the Earth's resources sustainably.  This is not justifiable 
through any scientific principle, but is the widespread view, even amongst scientists, because we as a 
species value our continued survival.  The world of Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis might easily take a rather 
different view.  
 
Milne suggests that the kind of moral philosophy enshrined in the precautionary principle is somehow 
unusual, but scientists are subject to just such moral restraint all the time.  Quite simply, some things are 
acceptable to society and others are not.  The recent past contains chilling examples of the extreme and 
grotesque scientific practices which can result when such moral restraint is lifted.  The memory of 
experiments carried out in the name of science by Dr Joseph Mengele on his concentration camp victims 
blows like a bleak wind through the halls of 'objective science'. 
 
The simple fact of the matter is that society puts subjective constraints on scientists and their work 
because society is based largely on values and value judgements.  In environmental matters, society has 
declared that scientists should be sure before they do something, just as they expect engineers to be sure 
when they build a bridge, because a proposal to alter the environment is not the same as some controlled 
condition laboratory experiment.  A bridge which turns into a Galloping Gertie is dangerous or 
inconvenient only for those wishing to cross the river, but we all have to live with the consequences when 
an 'objective' scientist inadvertently opens an environmental Pandora's box.  Winston Churchill expressed 




The precautionary principle and the 'proof of harm' 
It is probably true that it is not possible to prove conclusively whether or not a substance or action is 
'harmless'.  This is because virtually everything ultimately has some impact.  Obviously, chemical tests 
which prove the extremely insoluble nature of a substance are, nevertheless, irrelevant if such large 
quantities of the material are to be dumped that it will smother existing marine ecosystems.  Alternatively, 
construction of a roadway across a hydrologically sensitive peatland site may involve the use of an inert 
substance.  If it requires deep marginal drains to prevent it being washed away, the presence of the inert 
material may not be a problem per se (other than for the immediate area of habitat buried beneath the 
material);  the necessary drainage infrastructure to keep it in place certainly would be. 
 
The real-world context in which a substance or action may ultimately feature is thus a vital part of judging 
potential harm, but anticipating all possible contexts and evaluating their effects will often prove to be 
beyond even the most sophisticated environmental model.   In his book The Dammed, writer Fred Pearce 
provides a catalogue of consequences which have followed from the construction of the Aswan Dam in 
Egypt.  These relate to such diverse aspects as loss of the Mediterranean sardine which once bred in the 
Nile delta, the spread of bilharzia and schistosomiasis, loss of annual silt deposits on farmland in the Nile 
valley, the lack of fresh clay for the brick-making industry, widespread erosion of the Nile delta and its 
farmlands, the overwhelming of coastal defences and the accumulation of salt in agricultural land, this 
last problem to be tackled by a scheme which will cost more than the original construction of the dam.  
The complications imposed here by the real-life context are clearly quite overwhelming in their 
complexity. 
 
What is 'harm'? 
Milne states that the concept of 'harm' is scientifically worthless because it cannot be defined by any 
rigorous scientific method.  Despite this, the brick-makers of the Nile valley, or the inhabitants of Borg-
el-Borellos, now submerged two kilometres out to sea because coastal defences on the Nile delta have 
collapsed, would doubtless have a very clear opinion of what constitutes 'harm'.  Their views may, 
nevertheless, be disputed by fishermen harvesting fish in these new shallow waters, because 'harm' is 
indeed a subjective, rather than objective, concept.  The degree of change regarded as a threshold, beyond 
which something is regarded as 'harmful' must ultimately be a subjective decision because science puts no 
values on one sequence of events compared to another. 
 
Just because something is scientifically 'worthless' does not mean it is worthless in the real world, 
however.  If society defines its values, as it has done so in, for example, the UK Biodiversity Action Plan, 
it is then possible to use the best science available to provide data which can be set against these values, 
and balancing judgements made accordingly.  The precautionary principle may be based on the value 
judgements of society, and not, as Milne would like, on 'objective' scientific proof, but judgements about 
'harm' can be informed, rather than defined, by rigorously objective, scientific evidence.  The principles of 
biodiversity and sustainable use, as outlined in the UK Biodiversity Action Plan, make it possible to begin 




To act before 'harmful' limits have been identified is not scientific 
It may be true that, in the strict sense of the terms, such actions are not 'scientific' according to Milne, but 
to what 'action' does he refer?  It is actually a decision preventing change from existing conditions.  More 
accurately, it represents the imposition of no action until such time as a new proposal has proved itself 
free of 'harm' within the pragmatic guidelines provided by society. 
 
Milne's approach virtually endorses the instigation and continuation of an activity until it has been 
proven, beyond any doubt, to be 'harmful'.  It is difficult to believe that Milne seriously believes this to 
apply to all other scientific disciplines.  The pharmaceutical world is prevented by society from releasing 
new drugs until such time as they have been exhaustively and independently tested for evidence of 'harm'.  
The 'action' of preventing release of a drug even before the testing for 'harm' begins is standard practice in 
pharmacology, but is this unscientific?  Logically, one approaches with more caution a problem for which 
one has little data than one does another problem for which the data are largely complete. 
 
 
Without imperfect knowledge there would be no science 
Those, like Milne, opposed to the precautionary principle say that uncertainty is unacceptable and 
unscientific.  Yet if everything in the universe were revealed to us there would be little need for science, 
because all research feeds only on the unknown.  Today, the practice and application of science appears to 
be so anxious to deny this intimate link, this dependence on the unknown, that a popular perception has 
developed of the scientist as someone concerned only with concrete facts and absolute certainties.  The 
philosophy of scientific certainty and the fear of ignorance have brought about a general belief, not least 
in the minds of developers and politicians, that the scientist merely has to wave a magic wand over the 
problem for all the answers to pop out with the absolute precision of Ammann's Brooklyn Bridge project.  
Of course, this is rarely the case with the environment.  What society gets, all too often, is a Galloping 
Gertie. 
Nevertheless, people continue to believe in the science of certainty and the certainty of science.  
Consequently a developer, having paid a seemingly considerable sum for an EIA, does not want a 
consultant's report which lists page upon page of topics not investigated, followed by further pages of 
cautionary caveats in the impact assessment.  Nor does a politician or planning officer, faced with a 
difficult and potentially costly decision, welcome such uncertainty and lack of definitive guidance. 
 
This belief in the essential certainty of science is encouraged by scientists who make confident statements 
to the effect that no evidence of harm has been detected using the available methods and therefore it is 
inconceivable that any harm could occur.  This represents a fine example of scientific hubris, especially if 
such comments are based on limited survey and are thus a clear case of 'being economical with the truth'. 
 
More worrying still, perhaps, are confident predictions that Nature is robust enough to bounce back 
unchanged, or better than ever, after such events.  In the Marine Pollution Bulletin debate, John Gray, for 
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example, confidently predicts that, if ilmenite dumping off the Norwegian coast is halted at some point in 
the future, the marine ecosystem 'will be restored within 10 years'.  Restored?  Ten years?  Has Gray 
studied all aspects of the marine ecosystem in the area currently affected by such dumping, or is he 
talking only of the more evident components of the ecosystem?  Such confident statements about 
recovery and restoration (and such statements are much less rare in EIAs than are frank and detailed 
admissions of information gaps) should always be very carefully and critically examined. 
What is required is a subtle shift in the present scientific ethos, one which welcomes open 
acknowledgement of ignorance and encourages the limitations of any particular study to be fully 
explored.  If scientists were more up-front, enthusiastic, even, about the true limits to our understanding 
on an issue, this could, in time, engender a recognition within society as a whole just how enormous are 
the environmental uncertainties which currently face us.  It would also make EIAs more honest in terms  
 
Building bridges between developers and the environment 
The current state of affairs could at last be improved if those involved with EIAs, and perhaps the 
community of ecological scientists at large, were to adopt the philosophy of the bridge-designer.  The key 
factor in a bridge-designer's mind during the whole process is a constant searching for the unexpected, the 
unplanned-for discovery, which can then receive immediate attention before disaster sets in.  The 
philosophy, in other words, positively encourages the identification of knowledge gaps because the 
alternative of hiding such gaps under the carpet, pretending they are not relevant, could lead to collapse, 
catastrophe and perhaps appalling loss of life.  Other chapters in this book suggest that this may already 
have happened. 
The sequence of events involved in building a bridge is not so very different from carrying out an EIA, at 
least during the early stages, although, the bridge designer is committed to a much longer relationship 
with the final outcome than is the EIA scientist.  Before exploring this comparison further, however, it is 
worth turning aside briefly to consider four difficulties which are a chronic problem for EIA studies, and 
which add significant complexity to any such programme of work. 
 
The small extent of existing knowledge 
Unlike many of the traditional sciences, which have a formal pedigree going back many centuries, 
ecology is a very young science.  Indeed, the term itself was not coined until 1869 by Ernst Haeckel, and 
university courses have only been turning out graduates formally trained in the subject since the 1960s.  A 
discipline which has only received significant attention for the last 40-50 years, when some of the natural 
cycles already identified span 20-30 years, is obviously only going to be able to offer a limited base line 
of existing data. 
 
Funding bodies prefer 'pure' and 'big' science to practical dilemmas 
Unfortunately, the difficulties of being a recent arrival on the scientific scene has been compounded by 
the problem that research into the everyday, practical problems of environmental impact has been starved 
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of research funding for decades.  Even today, with the upsurge of green awareness and intergovernmental 
concern about environmental issues, the main projects funded by the Natural Environment Research 
Council (NERC) are the global issues such as greenhouse gas emissions, or oceanic current movements, 
or broad pollution mapping of the North Sea.  Ask any professional nature conservationist or planning 
authority what environmental issues require urgent research for the day to day operation of environmental 
legislation and the topics will rarely feature prominently in the NERC research budget.  The only other 
significant source of environmental research funding comes through the statutory conservation agencies, 
but these research budgets have been steadily reduced in recent years to such an extent that only fraction 
fraction of the priority projects can now be funded. 
 
The short time-scales available 
The lack of existing data will often pose significant problems for the EIA team, but such difficulties will 
generally be seriously compounded by the short time-scales generally provided for such a study.  The 
team is rarely given the time required to gather sufficiently meaningful sets of measurements.  A five-year 
lead-time for the construction of a factory, from initial concept to final completion, is not unreasonable in 
construction terms.  For many environmental problems five years is too short a time in which to measure, 
understand and model the existing ecosystem, never mind to judge the impact of disrupting this system.  
A hydrological budget alone requires the accumulation of data over several years in order to balance out 
the variability introduced by wet or dry years, and such a budget represents only a small part of what 
generally requires investigation.  Such environmental measures must normally, however, be carried out 
well within the period of preparation and construction for the proposal.  It is not unusual to have an EIA 
based on only one season's data, and in some cases on only one or two site visits, and even the normally-
excellent Environmental Assessment Handbook suggests that sampling might need to be carried out for as 
much as a whole year. 
 
The balance of time-constraints, cost to the developer and the need to obtain meaningful data is one of the 
central dilemmas of EIA work.  Millions of pounds have been spent on the underground deep storage 
caverns at Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant in Cumbria, UK, yet only now has it been established that 
the water-table of the underground caverns is connected to the regional groundwater system.  Such 
aquifer links are a common and expensive feature of regional groundwater regimes, yet how often will a 
developer be prepared to carry out extensive borehole tests to develop a working model of the relevant 
area of the groundwater and its behaviour?  Experience suggests that few can even afford to do so.  And 
groundwater behaviour is just one aspect.  Unravelling the causes behind the steady loss of Norfolk's 
spring-fen sites poses a multifactorial problem of labyrinthine proportions.  Any development proposed 
for the environs of these fens has a stark choice - become embroiled in an in-depth multi-disciplinary 
study, or ride roughshod over fears of further environmental impact. 
 
Natural systems are unpredictable or 'chaotic' 
Scientific investigation and modelling has been based for centuries on the assumption that all things are 
deterministic Newtonian systems, on the assumption that, provided everything is measured carefully 
enough, it is possible to predict precisely and consistently the behaviour of any system under any 
conditions.  Increasingly, this fundamental assumption is being revealed as incorrect, particularly for 
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natural processes.  The general rule seems to be that non-linear processes – 'chaotic systems' – 
predominate in Nature. 
 
Weather patterns are coming to be recognised as unpredictably chaotic even by the general public, who 
accept that it is impossible to predict that a specific shower will fall on a specific place at a particular 
time, but the weather is just one example of many.  This non-linear behaviour has profound implications 
for EIA studies.  Measurements taken from such systems provide only one possible set of initial states.  In 
a chaotic system even a fractionally different set of initial conditions will cause a model to spiral away 
from reality within an alarmingly short space of time.  This is why reasonably accurate weather forecasts 
are only possible for a few days hence, although even then the detail remains unpredictable. 
 
The worlds of the bridge-building engineer and the EIA ecologist should thus be very different in outlook.  
Bridge building is largely a deterministic exercise in the Newtonian sense, with only a few chaotic 
elements to cause the odd surprise;  ecosystem analysis is quite the reverse, involving a turbulent sea of 
chaotic systems which swirl around a few isolated rocks of Newtonian certainty.  Oddly enough, welly-
booted ecologists stomping round in sometimes uncomfortably close proximity to Nature appear to have 
been slow to recognize the significance of this new understanding of natural systems;  it is perhaps ironic 
that such insight has come from mathematicians and physicists sitting in darkened rooms, bathed only by 
the glow of computer screens.  Meanwhile, the ecologist still struggles to fit observed behaviour into 





The burden of proof 
Although many failures of EIA analysis are not the fault of the developer, but rather the desire of the 
scientific community to paper over gaps in the scientific basis of predictions, the developer is not entirely 
innocent, however.  Until the introduction of the precautionary principle as part of government policy, the 
burden of proof on environmental issues had been laid firmly on the shoulders of the environmental 
scientist and the conservationist.  Indeed, the desire to prove, scientifically, that damage occurs before 
taking preventative action is very attractive to certain types of scientific philosophy.  In the Marine 
Pollution Bulletin debate, John Gray argues forcefully for this approach in order to avoid accusations of 
'crying wolf' about environmental issues.  The counter argument, presented by Robert Earll, points out 
that the 'dump-monitor-act' approach is all very well but assumes that monitoring will tell us when to act 
and that we will know how to cure the problem once we have let it develop to the point of being 
recognisable.  In support of this, Alf Josefson argues that it is not wrong to provide cautionary warnings, 
even if the scientific evidence is not statistically significant, provided that a clear statement accompanies 
the warning to the effect that the issue is not yet proven. 
 
As regards industry's demand that the environmental scientist, rather than industry, should bear the 
burden of proof, Alex Milne makes the following revealing observation: 
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 One of the practical costs of these unscientific and impossible requirements is time and effort 
wasted by scientists in industry and government.  I was not reading the House of Lords Report HI 
23 or the European Commission's Marketing and Use Directive for fun, but because they were 
trying to put manufacturing industry out of business. 
 
Here we have the rub.  Neither of the two reports he was reading, nor the sentiments behind them, sought 
to 'put [Milne's anti-fouling paint] manufacturing industry out of business', any more than the Montreal 
CFC Protocol sought to send the refrigeration industry to the wall.  They are instead examples of national 
or international efforts designed to encourage industry to adopt new methods which, for whatever reasons, 
are considered to be less harmful. 
 
Milne's attitude reflects the impatience of industry reluctantly facing the burden of considering its impact 
on the 'downstream' environment.  Such a sentiment is in stark contrast with the demands of industry for 
the 'upstream' part of the manufacturing process.  Materials coming into most industries must be of a 
consistently high and predictable quality.  Thus particular water supplies, or rock types, or gravel 
deposits, or peat types are described as 'essential' for the continued survival of the industry.  Industry 
demands predictability in its raw materials and is quite happy to apply the precautionary principle with 
some vigour at the supply end, therefore, but is often keen to avoid being bound by this same principle in 
its outputs – or at least in certain outputs. 
 
A manufacturing or production industry – take the anti-fouling paint industry as an example – will already 
have carried out exhaustive tests on the paint product for the effect on a boat's underside (no point in 
producing a paint which dissolves the gel of a glass-reinforced plastic hull), as well as tests to ensure that 
the paint will not eat its way through the storage tins while on the retailers' shelves and presumably also 
exhaustively tested the paint's toxicity to humans.  A manufacturer's nightmare is the release of a product 
which must subsequently be withdrawn because of a defect in these, or any number of other aspects.  We 
can therefore be reasonably confident that testing for such features is rigorous, thorough and reliable; the 
same approach, indeed, as a bridge designer would employ when preparing a new design.  The difference 
with these outputs is that the customer can sue.  The environment cannot sue anyone, it can only suffer in 
silence. 
 
Even this high level of caution is, as we have already seen, still not sufficient to ensure that even the basic 
functions of the finished product can be guaranteed.  Galloping Gerties will always be with us, popping 
up unpredictably in even the most rigorously-controlled environments.  Yet compared to the care lavished 
by industry on the relatively straightforward processes of raw materials acquisition and subsequent 
product manufacturing, the level of attention usually devoted to the environmental 'downstream' aspects 
of production is extraordinarily meagre.  Milne seems to express a lofty sense of world-weary contempt 
for the idea that the manufacturer should devote any significant effort to evaluating such 'downstream' 
aspects of production, even if it is only to identify those areas where uncertainty exists - this is time and 





Improving Galloping Gertie's current form 
There are a number of ways in which the present unsatisfactory and haphazard situation could be 
improved.  Achieving these improvements would require a willingness on the part of industry and 
developers generally, and perhaps most importantly, environmental consultants, to embrace the 
philosophy of long-tern 'downstream' monitoring, together with all its implications and responsibilities.  
Like a puppy, an EIA is not just for Christmas, it is for life.  Both developer and consultant must be 
prepared to adopt the sense of responsibility and long-term commitment to their EIA that has been felt by 
designers of bridges probably since the first tree-trunk was felled across a river. 
 
Establish a single authority responsible for overseeing EIAs 
An improvement on the current EIA free-for-all would be to have a recognised authority to whom both 
developer and planning authority can turn when an EIA is required.  The EIA Authority would then be 
able to define for the developer those environmental parameters which should be investigated, and in 
what way, in order to provide the best evaluation possible.  If the developer's resources are limited, this 
authority would be capable of guiding the developer to the most critical issues.  It can then assist the 
developer in drawing on the accumulated archive of similar studies and scientific publications to assist the 
ES make best-possible predictions.  It can subsequently guide the planning authority in assessing the 
degree of certainty which can be placed on what has been achieved within the developer's available 
resources. 
 
One of the advantages of such an authority, for scientists involved in EIA work is that the authority can 
take responsibility for identifying those aspects which have not been or cannot be investigated.  It can 
endorse the practical decisions not to investigate certain aspects, while at the same time explaining to the 
developer and politician the implications of this for the certainty or otherwise of any final predictions.  
The EIA scientist is thus not left in what is often perceived as the exposed position of having to choose 
which aspects not to investigate.  Such choices can be shown instead to have been made in consultation 
with the EIA Authority. 
 
The Authority would also be responsible for accumulating the data archive from EIA studies, as well as 
pulling together information from published scientific data.  In this way it can establish best-practice 
methods for investigating particular aspects.  It can also enable EIA studies to maximise the use of 
resources available by avoiding work which merely repeats what is already know and instead identify the 
key areas which cannot yet be resolved using existing knowledge. 
 
Finally, the Authority would provide the long-term link required to ensure that, even if individuals in the 
company or consultancy change, post-hoc monitoring is carried out in a manner which is consistent with 
the requirements for monitoring change, that the results are collated and reviewed on a regular basis, and 
that this information is conveyed to the planning authority. 
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The EA legislation needs to be changed to incorporate after-the-event (post-hoc) monitoring. 
It would seem sensible to incorporate such a system into the existing planning legislation, with perhaps a 
three- or five-year review period for any scheme.  On the review date, the need for additional safeguards 
in the light of either evidence of change, or of improved scientific understanding, can then be assessed.  
The EIA Authority would be responsible for co-ordinating the efforts of developer and EIA team to 
ensure that the best possible advice is provided for this review period, but the decision would remain with 
the planning authority. 
 
Ecological science needs to become more chaotic 
Despite the increasing enthusiasm of the mathematical world for the non-linear behaviour of Nature, the 
number of ecological and environmental scientists making the effort to link up with non-linear 
mathematicians is very small.  There is undoubtedly a rich seam of understanding to be gained from such 
a cross-disciplinary collaboration, but it so far lies almost completely untapped. 
 
Edward Lorenz's paper about chaotic weather patterns lay un-noticed in an obscure meteorological 
journal for almost 15 years before it was finally re-discovered, to much amazement and excitement, by 
mathematicians and physicists.  The same is now in danger of happening in reverse; ideas from this new 
mathematics are filling entire mathematical journals, but few of these ideas are filtering through into 
ecological and environmental journals. 
 
Funding is needed for research to protect the environment 
There is no question that funding is available for environmental research, but only a tiny fraction of this is 
used to address practical environmental questions.  The major part of environmental funding goes towards 
big fashionable topics which have little practical relevance to everyday conservation.  The global picture 
is thus being studied intensively, but meanwhile things in our own back yard are quietly going to blazes. 
 
The UK's Natural Environment Research Council, ironically, regards the giving of research grants to 
study practical conservation issues as too applied, by which it presumably means 'too close to the 
environment'?  It is a revealing reflection on the scientific community's view of the environment that 
funding for large particle accelerators runs into the multimillions of pounds, but most practical 
conservation research survives on sums of a few thousand, if indeed any funding is available.  This is 
despite the fact that, in many ways, resolving some of the practical environmental problems in our own 
back yard can involve working on a system as complex as, and probably more unpredictable than, some 
of the largest atomic physics programmes.  Funding for environmental protection science is still stuck in 
the days of 'bucket ecology', although today some of the answers being demanded are beyond the long-
term predictive ability of even the most powerful computers. 
 
Scientists need to be more explicit about information-gaps and uncertainties 
Precisely because much of our understanding of, and modelling capability about, the natural world is 
currently so limited, it is important that those reading assessments and predictions fully understand the 
degree of uncertainty which exists. 
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Greater willingness to identify such limitations can produce two benefits.  Firstly, decisions can be made 
about development proposals on the basis of a full understanding of the risks and benefits.  Secondly, 
regular and consistent identification of gaps will generate a rich seam of potential research projects, as 
well as revealing and emphasising those areas of environmental research which urgently need to be 






At one time, the engineer faced a world which was filled with mystery and uncertainty.  History is rich in 
examples of edifices such as the Tower of Babylon, many early cathedrals, the first aeroplanes and 
'unsinkable' ocean liners, which produced rude and bewildering shocks because they all ended in 
catastrophe.  After 7,000 - 8,000 years of experimentation and trial and error, however, the engineer can 
now expect at least the majority of projects to behave as planned.  As Furnas & McCarthy observe in 
Time/Life's celebration of The Engineer: 
 
 ...the engineer has changed over the years from an ingenious improviser who worked by trial and 
error, to a skilled and systematic specialist who brings a wealth of scientific knowledge to bear 
on the increasingly complex problems of today and tomorrow. 
 
Scientists, wrestling with environmental problems, are still at the trial and error stage. 
In adopting the strategies outlined above, we have the potential to bring the work of EIA analysis from its 
current state of error and anarchy closer to the structured approach of the engineer.  We should aim to be 
able to say, if decline or disaster should occur –'Well, yes, we knew that was a gap in our knowledge-
base.  Let's learn from this to fill the gap and add to the knowledge-pool.'  At the moment the system 
doesn't even help us learn from our mistakes. 
Volcanologists can sympathise with the present plight of the environmental scientist and the EIA 
consultant.  A sobering observation made after the catastrophic eruption of Mount St. Helens in 
Washington State, USA, (thereby ending in the state where we began), and which could apply to all who 
struggle to understand the natural world, expresses it thus2: 
 
 ...Perhaps the most important lesson of the past 30 years has been the virtue of scientific 
humility:  Who knows which ideas that now appear untenable will turn out to be right, and which 
of those ideas that we currently accept on the basis of available evidence will seem hopelessly 
naive 2000 years from now? (p.15)  Decker, R. & Decker, B.  1989.  Volcanoes.  New York, W H 
Freeman & Co. 
Galloping Gertie was born because Leon Moitseief, in attempting to bridge the Tacoma Narrows, 
accidentally strayed from the relatively calm and safe waters of established bridge engineering back into 
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the uncharted reefs of untested predictions.  Those reefs cost Moitseief his reputation and Tubby 
Coatsworth his life. 
There are currently no clear open seas for the environmental consultant embarking on an EIA;  the study 
begins amidst reefs, beyond which are only bigger reefs.  The prudent professional acknowledges every 
reef and makes allowance accordingly.  When things become difficult, the little statue of Tubby should 
act as a reminder that insufficient attention to detail can destroy part of the natural world as surely as the 
final design of Galloping Gertie sealed the fate of the Coatsworth's dog.  A little caution and a ready, 




1.  Quotes from the 1993 Channel 4 TV programme Bridging the Future, written and produced by Chris 
Hawes. 
2.  Quote from Volcanoes, R. Decker and B. Decker, New York : W. Freeman and Co., 1989. 
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